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1. More than 95% of all Japanese corporations have less than 50 million yen of capital (About $333,000 when we assume 1 U.S. dollar equals 150 yen. Hereinafter we shall use the same base of calculation.) Department of Justice Statistics (1983) .
In the U.S., around 94% of corporations have less than $1 million in assets. Alfred Conard, Corporations in Perspective 99 (1976 parallels the legislative movement in Japan.
The big difference is that in the United States, there are many partnerships, in contrast with the partnerships in Japan. 8 The major reason for the different use of the partnership form in the two countries is the different tax treatment afforded the corporate forms. In Japan, from a tax planning point of view, the corporate forms (G6meigaisha, G~shigaisha, Yfigengaisha and Kabushikigaisha) are normally better than the non-corporate forms (Kojinkigy6, Kumiai and Tokumeikumiai). Income tax rates on individuals increase as the income level rises, with the maximum tax rate at 50%. 9 In contrast, there is only one income tax rate for corporations, 37.5%. 1 0 These tax advantages for corporate over non-corporate forms, however, are not present in the United States. Especially after the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the maximum income tax rate for corporations (34%)" is higher than the maximum tax rate for individuals (28%). 12 Although the legal forms of enterprises and the relative distribution of each type differs in the U.S. and Japan, there are many similarities between the closely held corporations in the two countries. Because many small businesses in the United States and Japan have ignored the forms of enterprise best suited for them, and instead chosen the corporate form, issues of shareholder and creditor disputes 13 and internal relations problems 14 have arisen that are similar in both countries.
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B. The Normative Corporate Model and Problems of the Closely Held Corporation
Four basic principles of the corporate model have been set forth: 1) limited liability for investors; 2) free transferability of investor interests; 3) legal personality (entity-attributable powers, life span, and purpose); and 4) centralized management (separate ownership and management). 15 It has also been pointed out that these four principles may need to be modified for closely held corporations. 16 The problems of the closely held corporation may be divided into two categories: substantive problems and non-substantive problems. Non-substantive problems are the procedural problems which arise not from the nature of the closely held corporation, but from the distortions caused by the legal system. In particular, they arise from the disparity between actual disputes and the legal issues stressed in litigation. Such disparities may come either from problems with corporate laws or from problems related to the applicable legal procedures.
Substantive problems are the problems which arise from the nature of the closely held corporation. They may be divided into two parts: problems between shareholders and corporate creditors (external relationships) and problems among shareholders (internal relationships).
As to external relationships (the relationships between shareholders and corporate creditors), abuse of limited liability by shareholders may occur in a closely held corporation. Therefore, some modification of limited liability of shareholders may be necessary.
As to internal relationships, that is, the relationships among shareholders, the problems are twofold: the problem of struggles for control and the problem of economic unfairness to minority shareholders. Each problem is especially likely to occur where an enterprise has passed by inheritance.
The potential problem of struggle for control in a closely held corporation is a motivation for modification of the corporate model as to internal relationships. In particular, shareholders of a closely held corporation may want to modify the free transferability of stock and the principle of majority control.' 7 The latter modifica-15. R. Clark, supra note 13 at 2; W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 13 at 91-95. 16. R. Clark, supra note 13, at 761. 17. The principle of majority control is the rule that gives anyone who owns majority voting stock or who can control majority voting rights the right to monopolize all board members and to manage the corporation as he/she likes within the business judgment rule. See F. O'Neal & R. Thompson, supra note 14 § 1.02. tion will naturally affect the principle of centralized management (the separation between ownership and management).
The problem of economic unfairness in the closely held corporation must lead to protection of minority shareholders by giving them some device to recoup their investment. Such a device, however, runs afoul of the principle that the corporation is an independent legal personality distinct from each shareholder.
In summary, the problems of closely held corporations in the United States and Japan, and the effect of Japan's new legislative draft on closely held corporations will be discussed in the following four sections: 1) Different ways of disputing corporate problemsthe disparity between actual disputes and the legal disputes that arise in litigation, 2) Protection of corporate creditors and restrictions on shareholders' limited liability, 3) The modification of internal relationships by shareholders agreements, and 4) Protection of minority shareholders and ways to liquidate investments.
Different Ways of Disputing Corporate Problems: The Disparity Between Actual Disputes and the Legal Disputes That Arise in Litigation
Anyone who compares the reported cases in the U.S. and Japan on internal disputes of closely held corporations will notice the following contrasts. On the one hand, the American cases are set forth in a straightforward manner and the actual problems involved are easily recognized. On the other hand, the Japanese cases are highly technical, and the actual problems are not recognizable from the case law.
American judicial opinions not only describe the legal disputes involved but also present the background facts in great detail, like novels. Japanese judicial opinions, however, present very little of the background facts. For example, although one may know that the plaintiff is suing to void the shareholder meeting, in many cases there are no clues as to the background dispute or the plaintiff's ultimate goal in litigating the case. This difference comes not only from the different descriptive styles of judicial opinions, but also from the differing legal systems in the two countries. The major dissimilarity between the legal systems is the differing legal process. 19
18.
A good contrast can be obtained by reading two typical internal dispute cases of closely held corporations in both countries: Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975) The Japanese system is a civil law system that is quite rigid. One can basically bring any kind of suit in order to demand payment or transfer a good (performance claims). 20 However, in the case of suits involving a corporation, one must modify the actual request in order to fit it into one of the categories of suits provided for in the Commercial Code, otherwise the claim will be dismissed because of no proper interest to sue (uttae no rieki). 21 Furthermore, courts are limited to addressing the legal problems raised by the parties themselves, as they are bound by plaintiff's requests for relief. 22 Courts have no way to balance the conflicting interests of the parties except through the procedure of compromise (i.e., agreed settlement). 2 3 In contrast, the American system, particularly in the areas where the law of equity applies, is flexible and works well. A plaintiff can bring almost any kind of suit. Therefore, what a plaintiff really wants can be presented in the litigation process. Courts are not necessarily bound to plaintiff's requests, and they may issue any injunctive or other equitable relief necessary to solve the dispute. These different approaches to the legal process are very apparent when applied to the internal disputes of a closely held corporation. A good example is the squeeze-out case, where a majority shareholder schemes to pay out no dividends despite large corporate profits, instead siphoning off the profits in the form of officers' salaries to force the minority shareholder to sell his shares at a distress price.
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If this scenario arose in the United States, the minority shareholders could seek accounting of the excessive salaries received by the majority shareholders. 2 6 If they sought issuance of a reasonable held corporations and its failure to revise the Japanese Commercial Code are the major reasons for the large discrepancy between the actual and legal disputes of the parties that arise in closely held corporations. Although Japanese legal scholars presently debate whether the problem is one of technical procedure or one of substantive corporate law, it can at least be said that it is a problem of the Japanese legal process as a whole. dividend, they could also bring suit to seek the dividend. 27 If the court were to find the salaries excessive and a waste of corporate assets, the court would order the majority shareholders to account for the amount over which the court considered reasonable. 28 If the court were to consider the restrictions on the dividends as a violation of the business judgment rule, 2 9 the court could order the board to declare a dividend setting forth a specific amount. 30 Also, the court could issue injunctions or distributions, if necessary, to solve the dispute, even if the plaintiffs had not asked for such relief. 3 '
If the same scenario were to happen in Japan, and if the minority shareholders were to bring the same suits, the cases would not be heard by the court. The minority shareholders must first sue for abuse of discretion based on the resolution of a shareholder meeting to ratify the excessive salary or that of not to issue the dividend. If the minority shareholders win, and the resolution to ratify the salary is voided, 3 2 the defendant has to account the entire salary because he/she loses the legal basis to retain it. 3 3 The court has no authority to declare what amount is a reasonable salary. Even if the minority shareholders win in the dividend suit and the resolution not to issue dividends is voided,3 the plaintiffs still cannot obtain any dividends until shareholders decide to pay a specific dividend at a new shareholder meeting. The Japanese courts have no authority to order affirmative acts such as payment of a dividend. 3 5 Among the lawsuits based on corporate actions in Japan, the largest number of cases deal with the setting aside of resolutions at shareholder meetings 3 6 [as well as the § 266-3 cases on a director's liability to a third party, to be discussed later]. The biggest reason for such a large number of cases on shareholder meetings is that a plaintiff has a great likelihood of winning such a suit. 3 7 Such a phenomenon arises from the disparity between corporate law and the actual realities of closely held corporations in Japan.
In a closely held corporation which has a limited number of shareholders, the formal shareholder meetings required to be held by the Commercial Code are, 38 in fact, not necessary. Therefore, in most closely held corporations, shareholders usually agree not to hold shareholder meetings but to keep records as if they do. Normally, there is no problem with these illegal acts because all the shareholders agree to it. Once an internal dispute occurs among shareholders, however, such procedural defects are a good bargaining weapon for minority shareholders. This is the situation underlying many of the lawsuits on the setting aside of resolutions of shareholder meetings ("suits for rescission (torikeshi)", 3 9 "suits for declaration of invalidity (muk6 kakunin)," 40 and suits for declaration of non-existence (fusonzai kakunin)" 41 ). In such cases, courts have no choice but to affirm the plaintiffs' demand and set aside the resolutions.
However, nothing is solved by such judgments allowing plaintiff to win since the real disputes are not the legal issues discussed in the suit. If the plaintiff is a reasonable person, the real object of proposing such a lawsuit is not the setting aside of the resolution of the shareholder meeting, but the obtaining of an advantageous settlement with the majority shareholders. Specifically, the plaintiff is likely to be seeking to force the majority shareholders to buy his stock at a higher price.
One major significance of the Tentative Draft is that it simplifies the regulations on closely held corporations, and proposed rules are more closely applicable to the specific nature of a closely held corporation. For example, it allows small entrepreneurs to dispense with compliance in form, but not in substance. Thus it does away with many of the deceptive practices that have been developed in order to meet requirements designed for larger corporations. 42 45 The former rule caused the "phantom stock" phenomenon and often led to later internal disputes. The Draft also proposes to eliminate investigations by an inspector nominated by the court 46 where 1) only small amounts of investment in property are involved, and 2) a corporation contracts to buy small amounts of property from a promoter after the incorporation. 47 The current regulations have induced many attempts at evasion of the investigation rules and fuzzy investments. 48 The draft ends the requirement for a supervisor 49 in small corporations which cannot find an adequate person for the position,5° and the requirement for public notice of accounting statements of small corporations, 51 instead, requiring their disclosure in commercial register offices. 52 Although such reforms of the corporate regulations based on the size of a corporation help to fill the gap between the actual and the legal disputes of a closely held corporation to a certain degree, they do not resolve the intrinsic problems of the closely held corporation. Suits for setting aside shareholder resolutions have in fact taken on the role of expressing the dissatisfaction of minority shareholders. If the reforms close the minority shareholders' only avenue for expression of dissatisfaction, they will ultimately only have a negative influence on the solving of the intrinsic problems of the closely held corporation. 5 3 The Tentative Draft does, however, as carefully discussed later, allows minority shareholders in a closely held corporation the right to compel the majority to buy shares,5 [Vol. 38 which may taken on the role of providing an avenue for expression of the dissatisfaction of minority shareholders and may be helpful in allowing the real disputes between shareholders to emerge in litigation.
The Protection of Corporate Creditors and Restrictions on the Limited Liability of Shareholders
Among the four basic principles of the corporate model mentioned earlier, the most important is the limited liability of investors. Limited liability for shareholders began in order to attract substantial amounts of capital from large numbers of investors who were strangers to each other. Therefore, this principle of the corporate model was probably originally intended only for large, publicly held corporations. 5 5 In actual practice, however, there are many closely held corporations with a small number of known investors which take advantage of limited liability by using the corporate form. Indeed, the limited liability of shareholders in closely held corporations has been recognized by most advanced industrialized countries, as evidenced, for example, by the West German G.m.b.H.
The problem with such a trend is that for closely held corporations, there are two areas with great potential for abuse of limited liability: fraudulent conducts 56 and undercapitalization. 57 In both Japan and the U.S., many abuses have occurred and thus modification of the limited liability of shareholders has been necessary in each country.
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Although both countries have needed to modify the limited liability of shareholders of close corporations, the means for such modifications have been different. In the U.S., judicial case law has created the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.
5 9 In Japan, the Commercial Code provision on the liability of directors to third par- 56. For example, a majority shareholder may: make the corporation pay a large salary to himself as president while his corporation is in red ink; make the corporation transfer its important assets to himself when he knows his corporation will be bankrupt; deceive creditors of the corporation to give it credit when he knows his corporation cannot pay the debt.
57. For example, a majority shareholder may run his corporation with just $100,000 capital and with tens of millions of dollars debt. When, in America, a situation exists that would be inequitable if the shareholders were allowed limited liability, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil strips away the fiction of incorporatedness, and treats the corporation as a proprietorship or a partnership. 6 2 This means that the controlling shareholder is individually liable for corporate debts. 63 In Japan, section 266-3 of the Commercial Code was originally intended to make a director pay damages to third parties if he did not use due diligence, and was not intended to modify the principle of the limited liability of shareholders.6 However, section 266-3 has become the Japanese version of piercing the corporate veil, since the controlling shareholder and the representative director are the same person in most closely held corporations. Section 266-3 also makes non-owner directors actual guarantors of the corporation. In the U.S., the necessity of modifying the limited liability of shareholders has led to the development of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, which straightforwardly denies limited liability to a controlling shareholder in certain circumstances. 66 In Japan, howrestraints on dividends, the relationship among those rules has not been clarified (R. Clark, supra note 13 at 91). note 18 at § 3-6). However, it is seldom used in Japan because of the overruling influence of § § 266-3 case law.
Commercial
62. See R. Clark, supra note 13 at 37. 63. It has been pointed out that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil may be somewhat punitive because "if the personal assets of the defendants exceed either the amount of funds improperly transferred to them from the corporation or the size of the inadequacy of the corporation's capitalization, piercing the veil and imposing liability to the full extent of their personal assets will overcompensate the creditors for the harm traceable to the defendants' provable or wrongful acts." R. Clark, supra note 13 at 82. [Vol. 38 ever, the same necessity has led to many cases which induce almost the same result, but which uses the statutory provision of section 266-3 on directors' liability to third parties.
One reason for such a difference may be in dissimiliarities of the two legal processes, discussed in Section I. In the U.S., a plaintiff and a defendant can directly argue the actual dispute in question in court and the court can use its discretion to balance the conflicting interest of both parties. In the Japanese legal process, a plaintiff must rely on a specific provision of the Code, and the court can decide based only on legal arguments surrounding that provision. For this reason, a statutory provision may sometimes play a role which the Japanese legislators never imagined, nor desired.
In addition to dissimilar legal processes, the differing levels of emphasis given to the principle of the limited liability of shareholder may be a cause for the separate approaches of each country. These emphases are evident after reading many American cases on piercing the corporate veil and many Japanese cases on the Commercial Code section 266-3. Generally speaking, in the U.S., adherence to the concept of shareholders' limited liability is more important than the protection of creditors. In Japan, the reverse is true. Because of the existence of section 266-3, Japanese corporate creditors, particularly contract creditors, may reach the private assets of entrepreneurs much more easily than their American counterparts.
Although there are many more cases which have held the majority stockholder liable for corporate debt by piercing the corporate veil in the U.S. than in Japan, 6 7 the general rule is that the shareholders are not personally liable for corporate debts, unless there is no fraud or the necessity of protecting a paramount equity has been maintained and the corporate veil has been pierced fairly reluctantly and cautiously, 6 8 particularly in contract cases rather than in tort cases. 6 9 Actually, "the law permits the incorporation of a business for the very purpose of escaping personal liability. '70 In Japan, in the event of insolvency of a closely held corporation, personal liability of a director to contract creditors is relatively easily admitted. 71 On the other hand, in the U.S., most cases where directors' personal liability has been argued are cases of financial institutions 72 and courts will not hold a director or an officer liable to corporate creditors just because of bad business judgment but because of gross mismanagement amounting to fraud, particularly where there is some misappropriation.
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In addition, it is common practice in Japan that major creditors of a small corporation, such as a bank or a large supplier, can usually privately obtain the guarantee of the corporate president (that is, the controlling shareholders) 74 and obtain a mortgage on his private assets. 75 This practice is culturally accepted, and is quite widespread.
Therefore, the following comparisons between the modifications of the limited liability of shareholders in the two countries, may be made. In the U.S., the limited liability of the shareholder is sustained even in very small closely held corporations. Only in exceptional cases, is the principle modified by the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. In Japan, the very nature of shareholders' limited liability has been changed as applied to small closely held corporations. Small closely held corporations have become closer to "incorporated limited partnerships" (G6shigaisha).
The Tentative Draft takes its strongest stance in its effort to protect corporate creditors. Its attempt to do this may be divided into three parts: (1) it stresses the concept of stated capital and uses it in ways to protect corporate creditors; (2) it reforms disclosure policies and supervises corporate accounting; and (3) it allows the personal liability of directors and controlling shareholders in additional new circumstances.
On the use of stated capital to protect corporate creditors, the Tentative Draft has several provisions. First of all, the Tentative [Vol. 38
Draft sets the minimum level for stated capital at 20 million yen (about $133,000) for Kabushikigaisha (corporations) and 5 million yen (about $33,000) for Yfigengaisha (G.m.b.H). It further requires Kabushikigaisha to have a "safe harbor" level of capitalization 76 at 50 million yen (about $333,000--consisting of the stated capital, plus an additional amount of earned surplus to make the balance of 50 million yen). These minimum levels of capitalization may be construed as a prerequisite to limited liability. 77 Second, the draft tries to close existing loopholes in the minimum levels of stated capital by creating criminal sanctions for disguised investments, 78 and by prohibiting loans from corporations to their shareholders for a certain initial period after the creation of the corporation. 79 Thirdly, the Tentative Draft requires more of the corporate profit to be reserved to supplement the stated capital. On the second issue, that of the reformation of disclosure policies and the supervision of corporate accounting, the Tentative Draft places a heavy emphasis on making the process more feasible and requires truly effective financial disclosure and supervision. It recommends that disclosure should be made to a commercial register office and abandons the current requirement of public notice of accounting statements. 81 The current requirement is unnecessary for close corporations and they are unable to follow it. 8 2 Then, it tries to place closely held corporations under the scrutiny of accounting experts by allowing investigation 8 3 or instruction 8 4 by tax accountants, instead of C.P.A.'s. 8 5 Despite the efforts of legislators, the aims of these proposed reforms will be very difficult to realize. Small entrepreneurs who have actually dispensed with disclosure of this accounting statements are likely to resist, and the measure has 76. Section III 14 and Section III 15 of the Tentative Draft could be interpreted to hold that the controlling shareholder will neither be liable for any labor or tort debt of the corporation nor be submitted to equitable subordination only if he/she keeps the level of capitalization over 50 million yen.
77. Tentative Draft § I 20. 78. Id. § I 11. Disguised investments are attempts to make an outlook of legal capitalization, in fact, without substance of money, usually by borrowing money from Bank A, then depositing it into Bank B which will issue the certificate of capital deposit, and soon after issuing the certificate, withdrawing money from Bank B and bringing it back to Bank A. engendered disputes between C.P.A.'s and tax accountants over professional boundaries.
The provisions of the Tentative Draft on the third issue, the additional liability of directors and controlling shareholders in certain new circumstances are logically related to the provisions discussed above. The minimum stated capital and effective disclosure provisions act as prerequisites for the limited liability of shareholders, while the additional liability provision modifies the shareholders' limited liability principle itself, and applies when the prerequisites are not met. For example, when a corporation does not disclose its accounting statements or when it does not allow proper inspection by accounting experts, corporate creditors can sue the directors for their damages. 8 6 In the following circumstances, a controlling shareholder who would otherwise be protected from liability by the corporate form may be held personally liable: (1) When the stated capital of a corporation is below a certain amount, 8 7 the controlling shareholder will be liable for any labor or tort debts of the corporation; 88 (2) When the stated capital of a corporation is below a certain level, 8 9 a loan from the controlling shareholder to the corporation will be regarded as an investment by the shareholder; 90 (3) When a corporation becomes insolvent, the benefits 9 ' obtained by shareholders from the corporation must be reimbursed to the corporation by the shareholders. 92 The degree to which the limited liability of shareholders is modified may be examined by looking at three aspects of such modification. The first way to view a modification is to look at the type of modification. A modification may be made by rescinding a fraudulent conveyance, subordinating the claims of shareholders who are also creditors of the corporation to the claims of all other creditors; or by making a shareholder directly liable to corporate creditors. 93 Another way to view a modification of the limited liability of shareholders is to look at the conditions of the modification. That is to say, whether the modification requires some evidence of fraud or is 86. Tentative Draft § II 2. 87. Generally for Kabushikigaisha, the legal minimum amount for stated capital (20 million yen) plus an additional amount of earned surplus to equal a total of 50 million yen. based only upon undercapitalization. 94 The third way to view a modification is to look at the maximum possible liability of a shareholder. For example, a shareholder may owe only up to the amount for which the corporation is undercapitalized, or he/she may have unlimited liability. 95 Here, we will apply the three aspects just mentioned both to the provisions of the Tentative Draft on the issue of increased liability of directors and shareholders, and to section 266-3 of the Commercial Code.
As to the type of modification, section III 16 on the reimbursement of benefits which shareholders have obtained from the corporation is not a true modification to the limited liability of shareholders but is rather a corollary to the rescission of fraudulent conveyances. This section, however, may play a role similar to such a modification because it shifts the burden of proving that the benefit received constituted reasonable remuneration. The burden shifts from the plaintiffs (corporate creditors) to the benefitting shareholders. Section III 15, which regards loans by a controlling shareholder as investments, uses the technique of subordination (placing loans to shareholders behind loans to general creditors), a technique which has never before been used in Japan. Section III 14 on the liability of controlling shareholders uses direct liability of shareholders, the method also used in section 266-3.
As to conditions for modification, section III 16, a corollary of the rescission of fraudulent conveyances, naturally requires some evidence of fraudulent acts. Section II 12 on the liability of directors where no disclosure of accounting statements has been made also targets cases of fraud. That provision makes it easier to prove a director's liability by shifting the burden of proof from the plaintiffs to the directors. Section III 14 on the liability of controlling shareholders and section III 15 on regarding loans by controlling shareholders as investments requires undercapitalization and sets a specific amount (50 million yen) to determine undercapitalization.
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Section 266-3 originally required some fraudulence, but now some undercapitalization cases are also within its range. As to the maximum liability involved, section III 15 regards a loan by a shareholder to the corporation as an investment "up to the amount it is under fifty million yen (the legally required minimum 94 for capital)." Therefore, it limits the direct liability to the amount to which a corporation was undercapitalized. Section III 14, which also requires undercapitalization as a condition, allows unlimited direct liability of shareholders for corporate obligation to workers and tort creditors. Section 266-3 also uses a scheme of unlimited direct liability.
To sum up, section III 16 treats cases of fraud, and leads to the same result as the rescission of a fraudulent conveyance in its method of accounting for the profit which shareholders have obtained from a corporation. Section III 15 deals with undercapitalization cases and makes claims by controlling shareholders subordinate to those of other creditors to the extent of undercapitalization. These two sections are logically consistent. On the other hand, section III 14 on undercapitalization makes controlling shareholders directly liable without limit (but only tort and labor claims may be brought). This section is an unusual form of modifying shareholders' limited liability because it allows unlimited liability for undercapitalization. This section is strict for controlling shareholders (or parent companies) of small corporations, since their tort liability may become quite large, paralleling product liability. Several unsettled questions regarding the scheme of the Tentative Draft on the protection of corporate creditors may be posed. Firstly, how will the interests of the different kinds of creditors be balanced under section III 14 (which makes a controlling shareholder owe direct and unlimited liability to labor creditors and tort creditors)? In particular, what will the interest of creditors of the controlling shareholders be? It is clear that any modification of shareholders' limited liability may bring harm to the shareholders' creditors. However, it is important not to harm them too much or credit will become difficult for small corporations to obtain.
In Japan, it is an unwritten custom for major corporate creditors of small corporation to obtain a personal guarantee of payment from the president as well as a mortgage on the president's private properties. 99 Will the labor and tort claims which are protected by the section III 14 rank above or below such mortgaged claims? If the tort and labor claims rank with the general claims, below the mortgages, the protection of section III 14 would not work very well because major corporate creditors, like banks, would take the private properties of controlling shareholders first. If labor claims or tort claims are ranked before mortgaged claims, a small corporation may be unable to obtain loans.
98. Compared to the United States, product liability suits are still much rare and the amount of damages admitted by the courts usually is much smaller in Japan.
99. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
A second question is whether section 266-3 will continue its role as an alternative to piercing the corporate veil after the adoption of sections III 14, III 15, and III 16, which allow for personal liability of controlling shareholders under certain circumstances. Perhaps so, but with modifications. Section 266-3 has not been able to sufficiently cover the "pure" undercapitalization cases 0 0 or the cases where controlling shareholders are not directors. Also it has been very difficult for plaintiffs to prove that the compensation given to directors is unreasonably high. The three sections of the Tentative Draft should be considered as supplementary legislation to the case law regarding section 266-3. Thirdly, whether the 'safe harbor' figure of 50 million yen' 0 will shield directors and shareholders for undercapitalization liability under section 266-3 is an important question. Also, it is not clear whether a controlling shareholder or director will be shielded for liability even where the business is so large as to make the 50 million level an extremely small level of capitalization. How section 266-3 will be interpreted to take account of this problem remains to be seen.
Modification of Internal Relationships by Shareholder Agreements
Professor Eisenberg has pointed out that the actual structure of governance for most corporations deviates greatly from the formal legal structures.
1 0 2 This is true even for publicly held corporations, for whom the formal legal structure was designed. 0 3 For closely held corporations, the deviation is even greater. Because of this, entrepreneurs who are planning to create a closely held corporation must first construct internal relationships which are suitable for their size and their members' expectations. Basically, they must refashion the readymade form created by the state corporate statute or the Commercial Code into a custom tailored form which will fit the needs of the particular closely held corporation.
The responses to the pressure to modify the legal model have differed in the U.S. and Japan. American law permits the modification of internal relationships by shareholder agreement, thus providing for "custom-made" structures. 0 4 In contrast, the Japanese tend 100. Although most cases involve undercapitalization and fraud, I have used the term "pure" capitalization to refer to cases without fraud. Cases involving fraud would be fully covered by Section 266-3.
101. Tentative Draft § § IV 13, I1 14, III 15. See supra note 76. 102. M. Eisenberg, supra note 6 at 1-6. 103. Id. at 37-68. 104. In the U.S., also, early decisions were generally hostile toward private order-to provide several legal alternatives among which a corporation must choose, resulting in greater restrictions on the modification of internal relationships by shareholder agreement. There are two basic pressures to modify the corporate legal model for closely held corporations: modification of the free transferability of stock and modification of the principle of majority control.
The reason for the pressure to modify the free transferability of stock is the same in Japan and the U.S. In publicly held corporations, the free transferability of stock is indispensable for gathering large amounts of capital from numerous investors who are strangers to each other. 1 0 5 Also, the free transferability of stock is no threat to the management of a corporation as long as they can control the majority of stock because the management is independent of such anonymous investors (ownership and management are separate). 1 '6
In closely held corporations, however, all shareholders know each other, and most of them participate in managing the corporation in some way (ownership and management are not separate). It is natural that these shareholders want to keep out outsiders. Although stock is usually not actually freely transferred in closely held corporations, the shareholders may want to place legal restrictions on transfer in order to avoid possible disputes. To legally restrict the transferability of stock, however, it is necessary to guarantee some means for the recoupment of the investments made by minority shareholders.
This background situation is common to both countries, but the ways of restricting transferability of stock differ slightly. There are many kinds of restrictions in the U.S. because shareholders can restraint transferability of stock by shareholder agreement. Some examples of restrictions used are: first refusal, 0 8 first option, but still require reasonableness of the restraints and notice to shareholders who subject to them. 114 In Japan, in contrast, there is basically only one way to restrict stock transferability, provided for in Commercial Code section 204-2 and the sections following. Under those provisions, a corporation may adopt a bylaw which restricts the transfer of stock.
1 5 Under such a bylaw, if the Board of Directors rejects a potential buyer of a shareholder's stock, the Board must appoint its own buyer to negotiate with the seller shareholder.
1 6 If negotiations fail, the shareholder may request judicial assistance in valuing the stock.
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Although it is also possible for some shareholders to force other shareholders to contractually agree to restrict stock transferability,"" the penalty for violation of such a contract is only compensaand such provisions are widely upheld. W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 13 at 422.
109. First options are almost the same as first refusals, except that the price of stock is not the offered price of the third party but is determined by the agreement creating the option. W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 13 at 421; R. Clark, supra note 13 at 765. The issue is the divergence between the option price and a fair price. W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 13 at 422.
110. Consent restraints prohibit a shareholder from selling his/her stock to a third party unless he/she obtained the consent of the board or the other shareholders. W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 13 at 421; R. Clark, supra note 13 at 765. This method is considered to be the most restrictive. Although some statutes and some cases are more tolerant against consent restraints, their validity remains uncertain. W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 13 at 422.
111. Particularly with employee-shareholders, corporations often retain the option to repurchase their stock when the employment relationship is terminated, even if the shareholder does not want to sell. W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 13 at 423; R. Clark, supra note 13 at 765.
112. Buy-sell agreements create both the obligation of a shareholder to sell his/ her stock and the obligation of the corporation or the other shareholders to buy them in the case of death or retirement of a shareholder. W. tory damages from the contracting party. The stock transfer will probably not be rescinded. 119 Thus, as to restrictions on the transferability of stock, the differences between the policies of the two countries are minor. Except for the number of methods of restriction, the policies are similar since restrictions are allowed and some means for recoupment of investments must be available.
As to modification of the principle of majority control of stock, there are substantial differences between the two countries. In the U.S., it is clearly possible to modify majority control by shareholder agreements, 120 but in Japan, it is difficult to do so.' 2 1 In corporations, it is a basic principle that a person who owns a majority of stock or a person who can control a majority of stock by means of proxies can elect all the board members and can manage the corporation, limited only by the business judgment rule. 122 At one time, in both countries, there was an attempt to let minority shareholders send their representatives to the board by using a cumulative voting system. 123 However, this policy could be evaded by use of a staggered system, in which the terms for directors were begun at different times. 124 Although in the U.S. it is still arguable whether cumulative voting is a good idea or not, 25 in Japan, it is almost uniform knowledge that allowing minority representatives to the board of directors is inefficient, and the cumulative voting system is of no substantial significance.
In publicly held corporations, minority shareholders can sell their stock in stock markets any time they are not satisfied with management. The centralized management system which is sup- ported by the principle of majority stockholder control is reasonable. In closely held corporations, however, some unreasonable situations may arise if the principle of majority shareholder control is strictly applied. Because a shareholder in a closely held corporation, even if he/she is a minority shareholder usually invests in the corporation in order to participate in management, (in contrast to most shareholders in a publicly held corporation who have no intent to participate), a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation has an interest in maintaining some voice or some control in managing the corporation. 126 At least, initially there is usually a "gentlemen's agreement" on these issues. Once a dispute among shareholders occurs, however, such a gentlemen's agreement is not legally enforceable.
The struggle for control in a closely held corporation may be construed as a dispute between majority shareholders and minority shareholders over the modification of the principle of majority shareholder control or an argument over institution of "proportional representation." In a joint venture, which is a closely held corporation among enterprises, this problem is almost always a major issue. 127 Although in family owned closely held corporations, there are probably fewer cases where the modification of the principle of majority shareholder control is disputed than in joint ventures, shareholder agreements which modify majority control are already popular in the U.S.
128
A typical joint venture agreement includes several types of "proportional representation." First, the allotment of directors in proportion to the shares held by each partner is discussed. For example, in a joint venture with a 51% and a 49% partner, in the absence of a contractual agreement, the principle of majority control would apply and the 51% partner could appoint all the board of directors. In such a case, however, each partner would usually arrange by contract to retain the power to elect half the directors. cide almost everything 30 and a minority partner would have no voice. In most joint venture agreements, minority partners establish their veto powers not only over fundamental changes, but also over other important business decisions such as the issuance of new shares, large loans or entry into new markets. 131 Third, how minority partners will specifically be involved in management is always an important problem in making joint venture contracts. In particular, which management positions a minority partner is eligible to fill, executive vice president, treasurer, or so on, is a point for major negotiation.
132
The background situations for modification of the principle of majority control are thus similar in both countries. The situations in the two countries are different, however, in the following ways. There is the differing recognition of the necessity for modification of the principle of majority control by contractual agreement. In the U.S., not only in joint ventures, which are created among enterprises, but also in family-owned closely held corporations, shareholder agreements which include modification of majority control are popular. 133 In Japan, although managers of big corporations have recognized the necessity for modification (because of their international joint ventures with foreign corporations), shareholders in family-owned closely held corporations do not yet sense any necessity for change.
The enforcement of a shareholder agreement which modifies majority control may be different. In the U.S., one is basically free to modify the statutory corporate governance model by shareholder agreement, 3 4 and there are several legally enforceable forms (e.g. voting trusts 3 5 or use of different classes of stock 3 6 ). In Japan, there is no guarantee of legal enforcement of agreements which 130. In Japan, the Commercial Code requires a special majority vote (two third of shares present at the meeting) on some important decisions like mergers or amending bylaws. In the U.S., most state statutes only require a simple majority. 
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133. See supra note 128. 134. In closely held corporations, a bargain should normally be enforced according to its terms, without regard to whether it is reasonable or fair. However, an execution of a contractual right leading to an opportunistic exploitation of bargained-out structural and distributional rules may be denied by the court through the fiduciary duty theory. This may create large problems for foreign corporations desiring to create joint ventures in Japan.
The Tentative Draft does not consider the necessity of modification of corporate governance by shareholder agreement, but it includes two important provisions which will affect the structure of control of closely held corporations. The first one is the restriction on the inheritability of stock. This section allows a corporation to have a bylaw which provides that the right to buy stocks transferred by inheritance may be given to a person elected at a shareholder meeting.1 3 8 The legislators may have considered the fact that inheritance tends to lead to disputes among shareholders and intended to prevent these useless disputes by allowing buyout by a person elected by the shareholders.
139 This section will be a very important modification on the free transferability of stock, and also may strengthen the principle of majority control.
140
The second provision is a section which gives preemptive rights to each shareholder of a corporation with bylaws restricting the transferability of stock.
14 ' A preemptive right is the right of every shareholder to maintain his/her percentage of outstanding stock upon issuance of new shares. 42 In both the U.S. and Japan, a board of directors has discretion over the issuance of new stock for flexible financing: when to issue, how much to issue, and to whom.
143
Although this scheme is reasonable in publicly held corporations, 4 4 there is a large possibility for management people in closely held corporations to abuse their discretion in order to increase their own power. 145 In the U.S., most joint ventures and some closely held corporations guarantee preemptive rights or vetoes on issuing new 137. Swisher, supra note 119 at 178-81. 138. Tentative Draft §III 3. 139. Due to a lack of adequate estate planning, inheritances are always triggers of internal disputes in family owned closely held corporations in Japan. Shishido, supra note 16 at 101.
140. This buyout right will avoid creating minority shareholders who tend to create disputes among shareholders. As a consequence, it will support the management power of a majority shareholder. 146 to shareholders by corporate agreement.' 4 7 In Japan, because such shareholder agreements are unlikely to take place, the legislators legally require preemptive rights for shareholders in the new Tentative Draft. This requirement will exist unless overruled by special shareholder vote (two thirds of shares present at a meeting). In a corporation, the principle of majority control generally holds true unless changed by shareholder agreement. This means that a person able to control (by ownership or proxy) a majority of shares can control most management decisions.' 49 However, any stock issued within a given class must be treated equally, that is, the economic interest of each stock must be afforded the same treatment no matter who owns it, majority or minority shareholder. This is the principle of economic fairness among shareholders.
50
In a publicly held corporation, this kind of economic fairness is generally guaranteed by the stock markets, since minority shareholders of a publicly held corporation may usually sell their stock at virtually the same price as the stock of majority shareholder. 15 1 In closely held corporations, however, economic fairness will not be obtained since there is no market (such as a stock market) for the sale of the shares. 151. It may be noted that in the case of merger or acquisition, the sale of majority control may bring a higher price. That point will not be discussed here. The typical pattern of squeeze-outs in closely held corporations is almost identical in the U.S. and Japan. Once disputes occur, a majority will first shut the minority shareholders out of management positions. Thus, minority shareholders are edged out from the most profitable aspect of closely held corporations: officers' compensation. The majority may monopolize all the compensation for persons of its own choosing, typically, its own family. Then, the majority will fail to issue dividends, which is the only other way that minority shareholders could share in corporate profit. Of course, when this is done, majority shareholders also cannot obtain dividends, but this will not matter because they can get at the profits through officers' compensation and other fringe benefits. Minority shareholders of a closely held corporation have no way to sell their stock in stock markets, as shareholders of publicly held corporations could. The final result will be that the majority shareholders may buy the stock of the minority shareholders for nominal amounts, and thus the majority can wipe out their "enemies" entirely.
153
Economic fairness is the sharing of economic interests by each shareholder in proportion to the stock he/she owns.-5 4 Although this principle seems straightforward, it is actually very difficult to realize in a closely held corporation. The basic reason that economic unfairness often occurs in closely held corporations is the lack of methods for minority shareholders to recoup their investments. 155 Therefore, in closely held corporations, it is necessary that the law intervene in order to provide a legal means for minority shareholdreason to believe that shareholders of either closely or publicly held corporations will be more or less 'exploited'" because " [a] closely held firm that insists on joint management and investment must offer a better deal to attract capital" and "[i]lliquidity is not the problem." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 104 at 272-75.
However, they seem to focus too much on ex ante argument and ignore the fact that most minority shareholders of closely held corporations were not in the minority positions from the beginning. No reasonable person would invest in a closely held corporation as a minority shareholder. He/she had no incentive to deal with a majority shareholder because he/she was a member of the majority group at that stage.
153. H. O'Neal & R. Thompson, supra note 14, § § 3.01-3.02; R. Clark, supra note 13 at 792.
154. See, supra note 150 and accompanying text. 155. See, supra note 152 and accompanying text. Professor Karjala pointed out that Japanese law is "surprisingly liberal" on voluntary dissolutions because it provides that a corporation is dissolved upon the occurrence of any reason specified in the article of incorporation, as well as by resolution of the general meeting. Commercial Code § § 94, 404; G.m.b.H. act § 691. He suggests that, through advance planning, minority shareholders can use these provisions to protect their interests. Although there may be a problem with specific enforcement of such agreements, he argues, a damages remedy will often provide effective protection. Karjala, "The Closely Held Enterprise Under Japanese Law," 7 Boston Univ. Intl. L.J. 229, 245-46 (1989). Japanese courts are, however, often reluctant to use dissolution to protect minority shareholders. See infra text accompanying note 181.
ers to recoup their investments and prevent economic unfairness. 156 However, judicial or legislative intervention to provide such recoupment of investments interferes with another important principle of the corporate model: the independent legal personality of a corporation and its corollary, corporate perpetuity.
7
Providing a legal means for recoupment of investments to minority shareholders of closely held corporations is equal to giving minority shareholders the right to sell their stocks to the corporation or the majority shareholders. Where buying out the minority shares is financially impossible, minority shareholders may be given the right to dissolve the corporation. 15 8 Forcing a corporation to buy minority stock clearly modifies the principle of the independent legal personality of a corporation, that is, the principle that the powers, life span and purpose of the corporation are independent from the shareholders, similarly giving minority shareholders the right to dissolve the corporation is a modification of the principle of corporate perpetuity, the principle that the life span of the corporation is independent of the will of the individual shareholders.
59
Although forcing majority shareholders to buy minority stocks appears simpler, there is virtually no difference between making a majority shareholder buy minority stocks and making the closely held corporation buy them, since a majority shareholder is likely to borrow money for the purchase from the corporation. Even if a majority shareholder has enough money to buy minority stock, it will affect both the corporation and the majority shareholder, because that money might have been used for the future development of the 157. R. Clark, supra note 13 at 15-21, 762-63. 158. The most extreme proposal is to give every minority shareholder in a closely held corporation an unconditional right to sell out their stocks to the corporation or the majority shareholders. If they refused to purchase at the fair price, the corporation would be dissolved. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 152 at 1-3, 6.
159. A partnership could be dissolved on the will of the individual partner. Uniform Partnership Act § 29.
Hillman, however, pointed out that the single contrast of corporate perpetuity and partnership free dissolvability is misleading. corporation. 160 Where the majority shareholder cannot buy the stocks, the corporation must be dissolved. Therefore, forcing a majority shareholder to buy is also a modification of the independent legal personality of the corporation and the principle of corporate perpetuity.
An arguable issue on the legal modification of these principles is how far the law should go. Two aspects concerning the degree of intervention are these: 1) what conditions should be present for minority shareholders to have the right to sell their stock, or the right to dissolve the corporation; and 2) what price should majority shareholders or the corporation pay for minority stock. Thus far in Japan, the law has rarely intervened in economic conflicts among shareholders. 161 The Tentative Draft, as will be discussed later, has recognized the necessity of legal intervention. 162 In the U.S., there are many cases and statutes on this issue.
163
On the first point, the conditions necessary for the minority shareholders rights to be present, there are two extreme positions. One is to require either deadlock among the shareholders or directors or maladministration and waste. 164 The other is to require nothing-no conditions whatsoever. 165 Intermediate positions also exist.
Most American cases require "oppression" of minority shareholders by a majority before the minority shareholders can force the purchase of their stock or dissolve the corporation. 166 In other words, "bad faith" on the part of the majority is required. 167 The second issue, the valuation of the stock, is closely related to the first issue, the necessary conditions for selling out. No matter how relaxed the conditions for forced purchase by the majority or the corporation, such protection for the minority shareholder is worthless if the stock is valued too cheaply. Conversely, if the conditions are impossible for the minority shareholders to meet, high valuation of the stock is useless to the minority shareholder.
Japan and the U.S. has no statutory provision which provides specific guidelines as to the valuation of the stock. 171 There are many cases on the valuation of stock, however, in both countries:
dealing. White v. Perkins, 189 S.E.2d 315, 319-20. Clark says that "oppression" should be interpreted as a breach of the majority shareholders' fiduciary duty of loyalty to the minority, which includes two main categories of behavior patterns: selfdealing and squeeze-out moves. R. Clark, supra note 13 at 792. 
170.
On the other hand, there is an argument which criticizes the effort to ease dissolution. "If it is easy to dissolve a firm, there will be more deadlocks, more claims of oppression. The threat to create a deadlock (or claim oppression) may be used to induce the other party to hand over more of the firm's profits. The anticipation of opportunistic behavior of this sort will make the entire business transaction less attractive as an initial matter." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 104 at 287.
171. The Model Act defines "fair value" very generally as "the value of the shares immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action to which the dissenter objects, excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action unless exclusion would be inequitable." Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 13.01(3). And Comment 3 explains: "the definition.., leaves to the party (and ultimately the courts) the details by which 'fair value' is to be determined within the broad outlines of the definition. This definition leaves untouched the accumulated case law about market value, value based on prior sales, capitalized earnings value and asset value."
The Delaware Statute says ". . . the Court shall appraise the shares, determining their fair value exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation .... In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant factors." Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 262(h). The New York Statute instructs: "In fixing the fair value of the shares, the court shall consider the nature of the transaction giving rise to the shareholder's right to receive payment for shares and its effects on the corporation and its shareholders, the concept and methods then customary in the relevant securities and financial markets for determining fair value of shares of a corporation engaging in a similar transaction under comparable circumstances and all other relevant factors." NY Bus. Corp. Law § 623(4). In case of appraisal, the California Statute just instructs appraisers to determine "the fair market value." Cal. Gen. Corp. Law § 1305(a). On the other hand, when avoiding dissolution it admits "fair value" to "moving parties" and shows some specified criteria: "The fair value shall be determined on the basis of the liquidation value as of the valuation date but taking into account the possibil- and market value.
176
There are two special characteristics of Japanese case law on the valuation of stock. Although in the U.S. methods for valuing of stock take it for granted that the investment value (particularly, earnings value) is higher than the net asset value (particularly, liquiity, if any, of sale of the entire business as a going concern in a liquidation." Cal. Gen. Corp. Law § 2000(a).
The Japanese Commercial Code shows much more general guidance. 174. Net asset value is what we value the corporation on a stock basis. There are three kinds of net asset value: book value, going concern value, and liquidation value. The book value is easy to calculate but only as historical data regarding corporate assets. The going concern value hypothesizes the sale of the corporation as a whole and, therefore, includes the value of goodwill. In other words, the going concern value should be equal to the earnings value in most cases. The liquidation value hypothesizes dissolution and distribution of the corporate assets. The meaningful net asset value is the liquidation value.
175. Investment value is what we value the corporation on a cash flow basis. It capitalizes annual earnings (earnings value) or dividends (dividends value) by interest rate (opportunity costs) and some discount for risks. Theoretically, future prospective earnings should be taken as annual earnings. In American case law, however, courts always take the average annual earnings figure, based on the corporation's recent earnings history. E.g., In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, McNeil & Libby 406 A.2d 54 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1976). Both in the U.S. and in Japan, earnings value is considered to be the most important factor in valuation of a corporation.
176. Market value is the price at which the stock is selling on the market. The problem is that there is no reliable market for closely held stocks. Therefore, when we say "market value" in a closely held corporation context, it is not a real market value, but a reconstructed or hypothetical market value. A reconstructed market value can be calculated based on limited transactions that have previously occurred. E.g., Application of Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 477, 213 A.2d 203 (1965) . Particularly in Japan, the method of calculating the reconstructed market value of a closely held stock by comparing the book value, earnings value and dividend value of the closely held corporation with those of some publicly held corporations in the same industry is quite influential. dation value), because of goodwill, 177 in Japan, the reverse is true. In most Japanese court cases the liquidation value is higher than the investment value, because of the high price of land.
178 Current land prices are so high that a corporation would have to be dissolved if net asset valuation is used. It is no exaggeration that this is the hottest issue in Japan: how to decrease the court-assessed price of the stock by using formulas that include the investment value and the reconstructed market value, thus watering down the total value of the stock.
Secondly, in Japan, there is a strong emphasis on the rights of employees, and this emphasis is reflected in Japanese case law. 179 Indeed, it is widely accepted in society that the welfare of the employee is the most important goal of a corporation.
1 8 0 Therefore, courts are very reluctant to value stock in a way that would reflect full appreciation of the asset value (e.g. the land), because such a valuation might lead to dissolution of the corporation (if there are insufficient funds to pay for the minority shareholder's stock) and would deprive the employees of their jobs.
18 1 Thus, even where from a purely economic point of view a corporation should be dissolved, the courts will be highly reluctant to do so.
Up to this time, minority shareholders of closely held corporations have had no legal means to recoup their investments and they have been forced to utilize self help methods, such as setting aside resolutions at shareholder meetings (Commercial Code § § 247-252)182 or exercising the right of requiring the corporation to elect a transferee where transfer-restricted stock is involved (Commercial Code § 204-2 and the sections following). and in a Yfigengaisha, the Tentative Draft allows shareholders to require the corporation to elect a transferee of their stocks "when there has been extremely unfair treatment of some of the shareholders."' ' 8 4 In a Kabushikigaisha with less than fifty shareholders or one with restrictions on stock transfers, and in a Yfigengaisha, the Tentative Draft allows each shareholder the right to request a judicial order of dissolution. 8 5 This right presently belongs only to shareholders with at least 10% of the stock of the corporation. 86 The Tentative Draft also adds a general clause to the acceptable reasons for involuntary dissolution, "other reasons which make dissolution indispensable."' 8 7 Finally, the Tentative Draft has a provision that benefits majority shareholders, by allowing the shareholders opposing dissolution to prevent dissolution by buying the dissenter's stock188
In three major ways, the Tentative Draft is of great significance in changing the present law. Firstly, the proposed legislation would provide increased protection for minority shareholders of closely held corporations. 189 Secondly, it would provide deterrents to the oppression of minority shareholders by majority shareholders. Thirdly, the courts would have the chance to balance the economic interests of majority and minority shareholders. 190 As discussed earlier, a large disparity between actual disputes and the legal disputes around which litigation is structured is highly characteristic of suits involving Japanese closely held corporations. 19 ' The new laws would hopefully reduce the disparity to some degree, because the dissatisfaction of the minority shareholders could be expressed in ways more relevant to the actual disputes, namely, through lawsuits on stock sales or on dissolution. Further, courts could more effectively balance the interests of majority and minority shareholders through two judicial means: judicial decisions on the conditions for stock sales, and decisions on the valuation of stock. In particular, in valuing stock, courts would not be bound by plaintiff requests for relief, but could balance the conflicting interests of the parties (as with the Anglo-American principle of eq- 188. Id. § VI 2c. 189. Note, however, how much the proposed legislation might increase the protection for minority shareholders will depend on the case law. If courts take too restrictive a view on the condition of buyout or dissolution, or valuate minority shares only a nominal amount, the situation would not change.
190. Several questions may be posed regarding the Tentative Draft's provisions on buyout and dissolution. Firstly, the specific conditions for buyout are not clear. What precisely is "extremely unfair treatment?"' 194 It may be the equal of "oppression" as defined in American case law. 195 Officers of the Department of Justice have proposed several examples: "[1] no shareholder meeting has been held and no information on the current state of the corporation is available to shareholders; [2] although a corporation has made a substantial profit, it has not paid out dividends and given no persuasive reasons for its failure to do so; [3] an unreasonably high compensation has been paid to management that prevents the corporation from realizing its profits and majority shareholders will not correct the situation. '196 Because these examples are typical squeeze-out cases, 197 it is probable that the conditions for buyout are present when there has been "oppression."
The Judicial Officers have gone on to explain, "Although the condition [of 'extremely unfair treatment'] is not necessarily satisfied where a shareholder is simply not allowed to be a director, it might be satisfied where a shareholder is removed from that position without any evidence of negligence on his/her part." ' 198 This explanation seems to require less than the American traditional definition of oppression' 99 but more than surely situational economic unfairness 20 0 that is, some omission (e.g. negligence) or some act by the majority must be present. The legislators seem to have used the current standards of American case law as a model, but the precise parameters of the condition are still ambiguous. Much more discussion of this issue is necessary, particularly on the importance of balancing the interests of minority and majority shareholders.
The second problem is the valuation of stock. It is the most im- portant part of the legal process for the recovery of investments. Clearly, it is important to minority shareholders whether anyone (a majority shareholder or the corporation) will buy the stock. The real concern, however, is how much money will be obtained. The Tentative Draft leaves such matters to case. 20 1 Much more discussion of this issue is necessary in order for courts to effectively balance the conflicting interests of the majority and minority shareholders. 20 2 A third problem is the relationship between buyout rights and the right to require dissolution. In the U.S., these two rights are logically related. When a minority shareholder can demand dissolution, majority shareholders may prevent such dissolution by purchasing his/her stock. 20 3 Conversely when a minority shareholder cannot obtain enough of a remedy through his/her buyout rights, he/she can require corporate dissolution. 20 4 In the Tentative Draft, the relationship of these two rights is ambiguous.
20 5 From both a logical and a practical perspective, these two legal rights should be related to each other.
CONCLUSION
The common problems of Japanese and American closely held corporations are the following: 1) Economic unfairness to corporate creditors may frequently occur. In particular, the problems of fraudulent conveyances and undercapitalization must be handled. 20 6 4) There is an intrinsic demand to modify the principle of control by the majority shareholders. Minority shareholders who intend to participate in management are greatly interested in obtaining directorships and the power to veto important decisions.
9
The background for Japanese closely held corporations is very different from that of American closely held corporations in the following ways:
a) The actual underlying disputes among shareholders are not necessarily apparent in Japanese litigation because of the rigidity of the legal process. 210 b) As to the protection of corporate creditors, Japan's Commercial Code § 266-3 on the liability of the director to third parties plays a role similar to the American concept of piercing the corporate veil. This phenomenon, along with the widely accepted Japanese custom of obtaining the corporate president's personal guarantee for corporate debt, may have the practical effect of unlimited liability for small entrepreneurs in Japan. c) It is difficult to modify the structure of the corporation provided for in the Commercial Code and there is no guarantee that minority shareholders may obtain directorships or veto powers. 212 d) Finally, in providing a legal means for the recovery of investments by minority shareholders, the following points should be noted: a) astronomical land prices will affect the valuation of stock; and b) it is very difficult to recoup investments by means of dissolution or sale of a corporation because employees have great power. 21 3 It should be noted that these differences are all differences of background only, and are not intrinsic to the closely held corporation. The intrinsic problems of a closely held corporation are very similar in the U.S. and Japan, and certain features of normative model can be drawn. a) When assessing the protection of creditors, it is very important to find a proper balance of the stimulation of entrepreneurial spirit (i.e. limit liability where possible) and the protection of creditors (i.e. discourage fraud and undercapitalization).
b) The internal structure of a corporation should be flexible. Shareholders should be able to choose a structure which best fits the size of the corporation and the needs of the shareholders. c) For the protection of minority shareholders, it is necessary to provide "locked-in shareholders" an "exit," i.e., buyout rights. In 
